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civil and religious freedom, it will rapidly and greatly increase
progress and improvement in the internal affairs of each nation.
It will also introduce certainty into the law, as to international
rights and duties, so far at least as written and positive language
can save uncertainties; thus guarding individuals against unintended violations of the law, and tending to lessen the grounds
of controversy between nations. It will also provide a tribunal
to which nations shall be bound to refer matters of dispute, and
which, with authority, will declare the principles upon which all
rights and obligations are to be determined; and, by the annual
conference of the representatives of nations for the discussion of
the provisions of the public law, their amendment, and the facili-tation of intercourse, which is provided for, will insure the definite
settlement of the law on all new or disputed question's, and the
reciprocal adoption of modifications and improvements, thus placing all nations "on the basis of complete reciprocity of right and
equal justice" in all their relations with each other, giving to
each nation only what it is prepared to concede to others in return; placing each under the protection of every other, and multiplying and strengthening, and preventing the destruction of ties
which bind all together.
HOWARD PAYSON WILDS.
Nnw Yorn.
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withIt is settled in Ohio that independent of a constitutional prohibition, it -is
in the legitimate scope of legislative power to authorize a municipality to aid in
the construction of a public improvement such as a railroad, by becoming a stockholder in a corporation created for that purpose, and to levy taxes to pay the subscription.
The public or corporate interest in an improvement rather than its particular location determines the question as to the right of taxation for its construction ; and
therefore the fact that the improvement contemplated will lie mainly outside of the
state can make no difference.
The Constitution of Ohio provides that " The General Assembly shall never
authorize any county, city, town, or township, by vote of its citizens, or otherwise, to become a stockholder in any joint stock company, corporation, or association whatever; or to raise money or loan its credit to, or in aid of, any such com-
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..iny, corporation, or association."
An Act of 1869 provided that certain cities
-. ould be authorized to construct a line of railroad leading therefrom to allyother
terminus in this state or in any other state through the agency of a board of
trustces consisting of fivepersons, to be appointed by the Superior Court of such
city, provided that a majority of the City Council should, by resolution, have
declared such line of railway to be essential to the interest of the city, and the
said railway should have received the sanction of a majority vote of the electors

of the city, at a special election ordered by the City Council, after twenty days'
public notice.
ield,
That this act is constitutional.

TIrE facts are stated in the opinion of the court, whi6h was delivered by
SCOTT, J.-The question presented by this case is as to the constitutionality and validity of the Act of the General Assembly of
this state, passed 'March 4th 1869, entitled "An act relating te
cities of the first class having a population exceeding one hundred
and fifty thousand inhabitants."
The general scope and purpose of the act is to authorize any
such city to construct a line of railroad leading therefrom to any
other terminus in this state or in any other state, through the agency of a board of trustees consisting of five persons, to be appointed
by the Superior Court of such city, or if there be no Superior
Court then by the Court of Common Pleas of the county in which
such city is situated. The enterprise cannot, however, be undertaken until a majority of the city council shall, by resolution, have
declared such line of railway to be essential to the interests of the
city, nor until it shall have received the sanction of a majority
vote of the electors of the city, at a special election to be ordered
by the city council, after twenty days' public notice.
For the accomplishment of this purpose the board of trustees
is authorized to borrow a sum not exceeding ten millions of dollars, and to issue bonds therefor in the name of the city, which
shall be secured by a mortgage on the line of railway and its net
income, and by the pledge of the faith of the city, and a tax to
be annually levied by the council, sufficient with such net income
to pay the interest and provide a sinking fund for the final redemption of the bonds.
In pursuance of the authority which this act purports to give,
the city council of Cincinnati has resolved that it is essential to
the interests of that city that a line of railway to be named "The
Cincinnati Southern Railway" shall be provided between the said
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city of Cincinnati and the city of Chattanooga, in the state of
Tennessee, and this action of the council has been endorsed and
approved by a vote of more than ten to one of the electors of the
city at an election duly ordered and held pursuant to the requirements of the act. But fifteen hundred of the electors of the city
voted against the proposed project, and the gr ve question here
presented, on behalf of these unwilling electors and tax-payers,
is whether it is within the power of the state legislature to authorize the taxation of their property by the municipality for the purpose of constructing such a line of railway by the means and in
the manner prescribed in the act. The consequences which may
reasonably be expected to result from the exercise by municipal
corporations of powers such as this act purports to confer, both in
respect to public and private interests) are so momentous as to
make it difficult to overestimate the importance of the question,
and to demand at our hands the most careful investigation and
deliberate consideration. This is the first instance in the history
of the state, so far as we are aware, in which the General Assembly has undertaken to authorize municipalities to embark in the
business of constructing railroads, on their own sole account, as
local improvements. The railway contemplated in this instance
is several hundred miles in length, extending into other states;
the sum authorized to be expended in its construction is a large
one, and, should it prove inadequate for the completion of the road,.
we may reasonably expect it to be increased by subsequent legislation. These considerations, and the apparent abuse of discretion involved in declaring such a work to be so far local in its
character as to justify its construction by a single city, at the sole
expense of its citizens, all give a high degree of interest to the
question. But we must bear in mind that the question is one of
legislative power, and not of the wisdom, or even of the justice,
of the manner in which that power, if it exists, has been exercised.
Had we jurisdiction to pass upon the latter question we should
probably have no hesitation in declaring the act under review to
be an abuse of the taxing power. Let us, then, first inquire under
what conditions it becomes competent for the judiciary to declare an attempted act of legislation, formally enacted by the
General Assembly, to be invalid, by reason of unconstitutionality.
Courts cannot, in our judgment, nullify an act of legislation on
the vague ground that they think it opposed to a general "latent
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spirit" supposed to pervade or underlie the Constitution, but which
neither its terms nor its implications clearly disclose in any of its
parts. To do so would be to arrogate the power of making the
Constitution what the court may think it ought to be, instead of
simply declaring wat it is. The exercise of such a power would
make the court sovereign over both Constitution and people, and
convert the government into a judicial despotism. While we declare that legislative power can only be exercised within the limits
prescribed by the Constitution, we are equally bound to keep within the sphere allotted to us by the same instrument. On this subject we cannot do better than adopt what is so well said by Judge
COOLEY in his treatise on " Constitutional Limitations," pp. 128,
129, when, in speaking of limitations upon legislative authority,
he says: "Some of these are prescribed by constitutions, but
others spring from the very nature of free government. The latter must depend for their enforcement ,upon legislative wisdom,
discretion, and conscience. The legislature is to make laws for
the public good, and not for the benefit of individuals. It has
control of the public moneys, and should provide for disbursing
them for public purposes only. Taxes should only be levied for
those purposes which properly constitute a public burden. But
what is for the public good and what are public purposes, and
what does properly constitute a public burden, are questions which
the legislature must decide upon its own. judgment; and in respect
to which it is vested with a large discretion which cannot be controlled by the courts, except, perhaps, where its action is clearly
evasive, and where, under pretence of a lawful authority, it has
assumed to exercise one that is unlawful. Where the power which
is 'exercised is legislative in its character, the courts can enforce
only those limitations which the Constitutionimposes, and not those
implied restrictionswhich, resting in theory only, the people have
been satisfied to leave to the judgment, patriotism, and sense of
justice of their representatives."
And he adds on page 171: "Nor are the courts at liberty to
declare an act void because, in their opinion, it is opposed to a
spirit supposed to pervade the Constitution, but not expressed in
words." CitingPeople v. Fisher, 24 Wend. 220; Cochranv. Van
S'urley, 20 Wend. 381; People v. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244;
Bensen. v. .Afayor of Albanyj, 24 Barb. 252; Grant v. Courter, 24
Barb. 232; Mynshamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 391.
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We do not understand it to be claimed that the act in question
is an assumption of any of the powers specially delegated to the
general government by the Constitution of the United States, nor
that it is an encroachment upon the functions and powers conferred by the state Constitution on other departments of the government, and therefore impliedly withheld from the General Assembly.
The only questions, therefore, with which we have to deal are:
First, whether the act is within the general grant of legislative
power which the Constitution declares to be vested in the General
Assembly; and, second, does it contravene any of the limitations
upon the exercise of legislative power, which are either expressed
or clearly implied in any of the provisions of that instrument.
And before we can answer the former-question in the negative, or
the latter in the affirmative, our convictions must be clear and
free from doubt: Lehman v. McBride 15 Ohio 291; C.,
.
& Z. B. B-. Co. v. Commissioners of Clinton County, 1 Id. 77,
and authorities there cited.
Let us then consider, first, whether this act is within the general scope of legislative power, independent of special constitutional
prohibitions. That it is within the legitimate'scope of legislative
power to authorize a municipality of the state to aid in the construction of a public improvement such as a railroad, by becoming
a stockholder in a corporation created for that purpose, and to
levy taxes to'pay the subscription, must be regarded as fully
settled in this state by repeated adjudication. In the case of
C., 'f. d- Z. B. B. Co. v. Com. of Clinton County, 1 Ohio 77,
the subject was very fully considered, and it was held that, as the
State may itself construct roads, canals, and other descriptions
of internal improvements, so it may employ any lawful means
and agencies for that purpose, among which are private companies
incorporated for the construction of such improvements. And it
was said that, for much stronger reasons, counties might be authorized to construct works of a similar kind, of a local character,
having a special relation to their business and'interests.
And as the state might contract or authorize the counties to
construct these works entire, or create corporations to do it entire,
it was held that, as a question of power, each might be authorized
to do a part. The validity of subscriptions to the stock of railroad corporations, made by counties, cities, towns, and townships
of the state, under special legislative authority, has been drawn
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in question in many cases which have since come before this
court, and in none of them has the authority of the legislature
to grant such power of subscription been doubted: 1 Ohio 105;
Id. 153; 2 Id. 607; Id. 647; 6 Id. 280; 7 Id. 327; 8 Id. 394; Id.
564; 11 Id. 183; 12 Id. 596 ; Id. 624; 14 Id. 260; Id. 472; Id.
569: and the cases in which such legislative authority has been
upheld by the courts of last resort in other states are too numerous even for reference. A list of more than fifty such cases may
be found in Judge COOLEY'S treatise before referred to, p. 119,
note 4.
If we even admit that all these decisions have been unwise, yet
it is clearly too late to overrule them in this state. Were the
question a new one, and properly determinable by the judgment
of a court, we should perhaps concur in opinion with Judge REDFIELD, that subscriptions for railway stock by cities and towns do
not come appropriately within the range of municipal powers and
duties. Yet he is constrained to add that "the weight of authority is all in one direction, and it is now too late to bring the matter into serious debate :" 2 Redfield on Railways 898, 899, note.
And if, in the absence of constitutional prohibitions, a municipal
corporation may be authorized to aid by stock subscriptions in the
construction of a railway, which has a special relation to its business and interests, upon what principle shall we deny that it can
be authorized to construct it entirely at its own expense, when its
relation is such as to render it essential to the business interests
of the municipality? And upon the question of fact, whether a
particular road is thus essential to the interests of the city, this
court, in the case of the C., V. & Z. Railroadv. Iomm'rs, 10. St.
77, already referred to, quote approvingly from the case of Goodin
v. Cru my, 8 Leigh 120, in which it was said: "1I f , then, the test of
the corporate character of the act is the probable benefit of it to
the community within the corporation, who is the proper judge
whether a proposed measure is likely to conduce to the public
interest of the city ? Is it this court, whose avocations little fit it
for such inquiries ? Or is it the mass of the people themselvesthe majority of the corporation acting (as they must do if they act
at all) under the sanction of the legislative body? The latter
assuredly."
And in Skarpless v. lHtaylor of PMladelpiMa, 21 Penna. St.
147, it was said by 0. J. BLACK: "If the legislature may create
a debt, and lay taxes on the whole people to pay such subscrip-
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tions, may they not with more justice and greator propriety, and
with as clear a constitutional right, allow a particular portion of
the people to tax themselves to promote in a similar manner a
public work in which they have a special interest ? I think this
question cannot be answered in the negative. * * * I cannot

conceive of a reason for doubting that what the state may do in
aid of a work of general utility, may be done by a county or a
city for a similar work, which is especially useful to such county
or city, provided the state refuses to do it herself and permits it
to be done by the local authorities." The question in that case
was upon the validity of subscriptions of stock made by the city
of Philadelphia in aid of two railroads. One of these was the
Hempfield Road, which had its eastern terminus at Greensburg,
three hundred and forty-six miles west of Philadelphia. Both
subscriptions were sustained, and the court said: "It is the interest of the city which determines the right to tax her people.
That interest does not necessarily depend on the mere location
of the road. * * * But it is not our business to determine what
amount of interest Philadelphia has in either of these improvements. That has been settled by her own officers and by the
legislature. For us it is enough to know that the city may have
a public interest in them, and that there is not a palpable and
clear absence of all possible interest perceptible by every mind
at the first blush. All beyond that is a question of expediency,
not of law, much less of constitutional law." By the act under
consideration no railroads are authorized to be constructed, except
such as have one of their termini in the city which constructs
them. And that a city has no peculiar corporate interest in such
channels of commerce as lead directly into it, is a proposition
which, to say the least, is very far from being clearly true. And
as the public or corporate interest in an improvement rather than
its particular location determines the question as to the right of
taxation for its construction, the fact that the road contemplated
in the present case will lie mainly outside'of this state can make
no difference. The right of eminent domain cannot be exercised,
nor the road constructed in or through other states, without their
permission and authority; and the act in question contemplates
nothing of the kind. But when such consent is given we suppose
the particular direction given to the road can have no bearing on
the question of corporate power to construct it. It is also to be
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borne in mind that this is not a case in which the legislature has
determined a particular public improvement to be of a local character, and has imposed the burden of its construction on an unwilling municipality. But it is the case of an authority given to
a city to exercise its powers of taxation only for the construction
of an improvement which the local authority have declared to be
essential to the interest of the city, and even that cannot be done
till a majority of its people have sanctioned the measure by their
deliberate votes.
The towns and cities of the state are not the creations of the
Constitution. It recognises these municipalities as existing organizations, properly invested by immemorial usage with powers of
assessment and taxation for local purposes of a public character,
but which were, nevertheless, subject to control and regulation by
the state, and that these powers might be abused unless properly
restricted. The Constitution itself provides where the power of
preventing such abuse shall be vested. It declares, in Art. 18,
Sec. 6, that "General Assembly shall provide for the organization
of cities and incorporated villages by general laws, and restrict
their power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting
debts, and loaning their credit, so as to prevent the abuse of such
power."
It is very clear that this constitutional mandate cannot be enforced according to judicial discretion and judgment. In the
very nature of the case, the power which is to impose restrictions
so as to prevent abuse, must determine what is an abuse, and what
restrictions are necessary and proper. As is said by the learned
author from whose treatise we have before quoted, "The moment
a court ventures to substitute its own judgment for that of the
legislature, in any case where the Constitution has vested, the
legislature with power over the subject, that moment it enters
upon a field where it is impossible to set limits to its authority,
and where its discretion alone will measure the extent of its interference. The rule of law upon this subject appears to be that,
except where the Constitution has imposed limits upon the legislative power, it must be considered as practically absolute, whether
it operates according to natural justice or not in any particular
case. The courts are not the guardians of the rights of the people of the state, except as those rights are secured by some constitutional provision which comes within the judicial cognisance.
VOL. XX.-23
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The protection against unwise or oppressive legislation, within
constitutional bounds, is by an appeal to the justice and patriotism of tlic representatives of the peoplc. If this fail, the people
in their sovereign capacity can correct the evil; but courts cannot assume their rights :" Cooley's Const. Lim. 167, 168.
We do not mean to say that every legislative enactment is
necessarily valid, unless it conflict with some express provision
of the Constitution. Undoubtedly the General Assembly cannot
divest A of his title to property and give it to B. They cannot
exercise judicial functions. They can impose taxes only for a
public purpose. For it is of the essence of a tax that'it be for
a public use. Nor can they, by way of taxation, impose a burden
upon a portion of the state only, for a purpose in which that portion of the state has no possible peculiar local interest. But to
justify the interference of a court upon any of these grounds,
the case must be brought clearly, and beyond doubt, within the
category claimed, and such we are persuaded is not the case in
respect to the act in question.
We have been referred to recent adjudications in several states,
which are supposed to sustain the claim that taxation cannot be
authorized for the construction of a railroad in cases like the
present. In the case of Whiting v. ,S'eboygan Rtailway, Company, 9 American Law Reg. 156, it was held that "a statute
levying a tax for the sole purpose of making a direct gift of the
money raised to a mere private railway, in which the state or the
taxpayers have no ownership, is unconstitutional."
The case from Michigan of the People ex tel. RailroadCompany
v. Township of Salem, 9 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 487, proceeds upon
the same grounds. But in the case now before us, the road is the
property of the taxpayers who furnish the means to build it.
The recent decisions in Iowa are in conflict with the former uniform line of decisions on the subject in the same state, and in all
the cases referred to in either of those states the reasoning upon
which the decisions rest is in conflict with what we cannot but regard as the settled law of this state.
We are brought to the conclusion that there is nothing in the
general purport and main object of this act which places it outside of the sphere of legitimate legislative power. We proceed
to consider whether it is in conflict with any of the express limitations imposed by the Constitution. It is claimed that the Gen-
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eral Assembly, in the act in question, by authorizing the judges
of the Superior Court to appoint trustees of the contemplated
railway, have exercised an appointing power which is forbidden
by the 27th section of the second article of the Constitution.
The argument is, that the trustees whom the act authorized the
court to appoint arepublic officers; that their appointment is not
the exercise of a judicial function, or of any power that can be
conferred on the judges of the court as such, and that the conferring of this power of appointment is the creation of a new and
independent office; which cannot be filled by the appointment of
the legislature, whether the appointment be designated by name
or by reference to another office which he holds. In the same
connection it is claimed that this power of appointment is conferred on the judges of the Superior Court in violation of art. 4,
see. 14 of the Constitution, which prohibits the judges of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Common Pleas from holding
any other office of profit or trust under the authority of this
state or the United States. And it is further argued that the act
is in conflict with art. 2, sec. 20, of the Constitution, because it
does not fix the term of office and compensation of the trustees.
Are any of these positions clearly well taken ?
We shall first inquire whether the power of appointment conferred by this act on the judges of the Superior Court involves
the exercise of an appointing power by the General Assembly.
Were the judges thereby appointed to a public office ? In support of the affirmative of this question, we are referred to the
decision of this court in the case of The State on relation of the
Attorney-General v. Kennon et al., 7 Ohio St. 546. In that
case it was held that the selection and designation by name of the
defendants by the General Assembly to exercise continuously and
as a part of the regular and permanent administration of the
government important public powers, trusts and duties is an appointment to office. But we think the present case cannot be
brought within the principle of that decision. In this case there
is no designation of individuals by name to exercise any public
fniictions whatever. It is clearly the case of an additional power
or duty annexed to existing offices, and not the creation of a new
office. Upon the filing of a petition by the city solicitor in the
Superior Court, praying for the appointment of trustees, it is
made the duty of the judges of that court to make such appoint-
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ment, and to enter the same on the minutes of their court. The
power of appointment and of subsequent removal for unfaithfulness can be exercised only by the court as such, and all power of
control in the premises on the part of the judges ceases with the
termination of their judicial offices. It is true that the act confers a new power on the judges of the Superior Court, but, as was
said by Judge SWAN in his concurring opinion in the case referred
to, "if adding to the duties or powers of existing offices is an
exercise of the appointing power, then every new duty required
or power conferred upon any state, county or township officer
must be deemed the exercise by' the General Assembly of the
appointing power, and forbidden by the Constitution."
But it is said that the appointment of these trustees is not the
exercise of a judicial function. Suppose this to be so. Does it
follow that no functions except such as are purely judicial can be
constitutionally annexed to the office of a judge ? Can judges not
be made conservators of the peace, and as such be required to discharge duties which are not of a judicial character ? If no power
of appointment to any office or position of public trust can be
devolved upon a court or judge, it is certain that many of the
statutes of this state are invalid. Quite a number of statutes
have been referred to by counsel in which such power of appointment is given to probate judges, judges of the Court of Common'
Pleas, and judges of the Superior Court. But is it clear that the
selection and appointment of these trustees which the act requires
to be made by the judges of the Superior Court, and to be entered on the minutes of the court, is in no sense a judicial act? It is
the act of a court, and the selection of the trustees and the fixing the amount of their bonds require the'exercise of judgment
and discretion. Authorities are not wanting to show that such
an act is properly judicial in its character.
Thus where a statute of New York authorized a town to issue
bonds to aid in the construction of a railroad, and made it the
duty of the county judge to appoint under his hand and seal three
commissioners to carry into effect the purposes of the' act, it was
held by the Supreme Court of that state that the act of making
such appointment was judicial.
It was said by the court: "The action sought from the county
judge is judicial. It is conferred by the statute upon the office
of county judge to be exercised under its seal. The duty requires
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the exercise of judgment and discretion in the selection of commissioners. The individual is in no way responsible for any act
of those he may select in the discharge of their duties. In no
sense is the act of selecting commissioners ministerial. They do
not act on the command of the county judge. He issues no process to them. If after appointment the persons designated accept
and act, they do so under and by virtue of the statute, and not'
in virtue of the order designating them as commissioners :"
Nor do we think that
Sweet v. Hfulbert, 51 Barb. 315.
these trustees are -officers within the meaning of that clause of
the Constitution, which provides that "The General Assembly, in
cases not provided for in this Constitution, shall fix the term of
office and the compensation of all officers."
This clause cannot be regarded as comprehending more than
such offices as may be created to aid in the permanent administration of the government. It cannot include all the agencies
which the General Assembly may authorize municipal and other
corporations to employ for local and temporary purposes. These
trustees have no connection with the government of the state, or
of any of its subdivisions. They have nothing to do with the general protection and security of persons or property. Their sole
duty is to procure and superintend the construction of a particular road, and to lease it when constructed. When this shall
have been done, so far as appears from the act, their functions
end. And in the road, when constructed, the state will have no
proprietary interest. All the railroads of the state, though owned
and operated by private corporations, are in an important sense
public improvements, yet the officers who manage them and superintend their pecuniary interests are not public officers, within the
meaning of this constitutional provision. No one supposes that
the compensation of such officers must be fixed by the legislature.
It remains to consider, with reference to the general purpose
and object of the act, whether there are in the Constitution special limitations on the general legislative power vested in the General Assembly which prohibits the authorizing of a city to raise,
by taxation of its citizens, the means for constructing a railroad
leading into such city, when such an improvement is deemed by
a majority of the citizens to be essential to its interests. It is
claimed that the grant of such authority is in violation of article
8, section 6, of the Constitution, which reads as follows:
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"Art. VIII. Sec. 6.-The General Assembly shall never
authorize any county, city, town, or township, by vote of, its citizens, or otherwise, to become a stockholder in any joint stock
company, corporation, or association whatever; or to raise money
or loan its credit to, or in aid of, any such company, corporation,
or association."
It is proper to consider this section in connection with the sections which precede it in the same article, and with some provisions found in other articles which bear more or less directly upon
the same and kindred subjects.
The first two sections of this article enumerate the purposes
for which the state may contract debts, arId the third section declares that except the debts thus specified, "no debt whatever
shall hereafter be created by or on behalf of the state." The
fourth section declares that "the credit of the state shall not, in
any manner, be given or loaned to or in aid of any individual,
association, or corporation whatever, nor shall the state ever hereafter become a joint owner or stockholder in any company or association, in this state or elsewhere, formed for any purpose whatever." The 5th section forbids the assumption by the state of
the debts of any county, city, town, or township, or of any corporation whatever, unless such debts shall have been created to
repel invasion, suppress insurrection, or defend the state in war.
In article 12, section 6, it is declared "the state shall never contract any debt for purposes of internal improvement."
And article 13, section 6, provides as follows: "The General
Assembly shall provide for the organization of cities and incorporated villages by general laws, and restrict their powers of
taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts, and
loaning their credit, so as to prevent the abuse of such power."
In Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio 613, 614, it was held, and we think
properly, that the limitations imposed upon the state by the first
three sections of article 8 were not intended as limitations upon
her political subdivisions, her counties and townships. And the
clear implications of the 5th section are that counties, cities,
towns, and townships may create debts to repel invasion, suppress
insurrection, or defend the state in war, which the state may
assume, and may also create debts for other purposes, which the
state is forbidden to assume. By the 4th section a limitation
is imposed in respect to the state, similar to that prescribed in the
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6th section in regard to counties, cities, towns, and townships.
The state and her municipalities and subdivisions are clearly distnguished, and treated of separately. It is to the latter that
the inhibitions of the 6th section relate. 'What are the extent
and purport of those inhibitions ? Its own language must furnish
the answer to this question, if that language be plain and unambiguous. Of course, I do not mean that we are bound to adhere
strictly to the letter, without regard to the evident meaning and
spirit of the instrument. The fundamental law of the state is to
be construed in no such narrow and illiberal spirit. On the contrary, it is to be construed according to its intention where that
is clear, and that which clearly falls within the reason of the
prohibition maybe regarded as embodied in it. Still it is very
clear that we have no power to amend the Constitution, under
the color of construction, by interpolating provisions not suggested by the language of any part of it. We cannot supply all
omissions, which we may believe have arisen from inadvertence
on the part of the constitutional convention. Recurring, then,
to the language of this section, it is quite evident that it was not
intended to prohibit the construction of railroads, nor, indeed, to
prohibit any species of public improvements.
The section contains no direct reference to railroads, nor to
any other special classes of improvements or enterprises. The
inhibitions are directed only against a particular manner or means
by which, under the Constitution of 1802, many public improvements had been accomplished. And its language is sufficiently
comprehensive to embrace every enterprise involving the expenditure of money and the creation of pecuniary liabilities. Under
the Constitution of 1802, numerous special acts of legislation had
authorized counties, cities, towns, and townships to become stockholders in private corporations organized for the construction of
railroads, to be owned and operated by such corporations. The
stock thus subscribed by the local authorities was generally
authorized to be"paid for by the issue of bonds, which were to be
paid by taxes assessed upon the property of their constituent
bodies. Many of these enterprises proved unprofitable, and the
stock became valueless. Some of them wholly failed. Heavy
taxation followed to meet and discharge the interest and principal
of the bonds thus issued. Towns and townships. were induced ti)
attempt repudiation of their contracts.
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And, as the records of this court abundantly show, the assessment and collection of the taxes which the preservation of good
faith required, had repeatedly to be enforced by mandamus. In
many, if not all of these cases, it was alleged that the stock subscriptions sought to be enforced had been voted for and made
under the influence of false and fraudulent representations made
by interested officers and agents of the corporation to be aided
by the subscription. At the time of the formation and adoption
of the present Constitution, these evils had begun to be seriously
felt, and excited the gravest apprehensions of calamitous results.
Under such circumstances, this section was made a part of the
state Constitution.
It may be well again to recur to its' language: "The General
Assembly shall never authorize any county, city, town, or township,
by vote of its citizens or otherwise, to become a stockholder in
any joint stock company, corporation, or association whatever,
or to raise money for, or loan its credit to, or in aid of, any such
company, corporation, or association."
The mischief which this section interclicts is a business partnership between a municipality or subdivision of the state and individuals," or private corporations or associations. It forbids the
union of public and private capital or credit in any enterprise
whatever. In no project originated by individuals, whether associated or otherwise, with a view to gain, are the municipal bodies
named permitted to participate in such manner as to incur pecuniary expense or liability. They may neither become stockholders,
nor furnish money or credit for the benefit of the parties interested
therein. Though joint stock companies, corporations, and associations only are named, we do not doubt that the reason of the
prohibition would render it applicable to the case of a single
individual. The evil would be the same whether the public
suffered from the cupidity of a single person or from that of
several persons associated together.
As this alliance between public and private interests is clearly
prohibited in respect to all enterprises of whatever kind, if we
hold that these municipal bodies cannot do on their own account
what they are forbidden to do on the joint account of themselves
and private partfiers, it follows that they are powerless to make
any improvement, however necessary, with their own means, and
on their own sole account. We may be very sure that a purpose
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so unreasonable was never entertained by the framers of the Constitution.
Besides, if this section is to be construed so as to prohibit
municipal corporations from making improvements on their own
account and with their own means, then the fourth section of this
same article, which is quite similar in language, must be held to
prohibit the making of any improvements by the state, on her
own account and with her own means. This would not onlv be
highly unreasonable, but would conflict with the clear implications
of the section which prohibits the state from contractingang debt
for purposes of internal improvements.
This implies that the state may make all such improvements as
will not involve the creation of a debt.
We find ourselves unable, therefore, upon any established rules
of construction, to find in this section the inhibition claimed by
counsel to arise by implication.
It may be, and indeed I think it very probable, that had the
framers of the Constitution contemplated the possibility of the
grant to a municipal corporation of such powers as the acts under
consideration confer, they would have interposed further limitations upon legislative discretion. But omissions of such a grave
character surely cannot be supplied according to the conjectures
of a court.
It is agreed, however, that the trustees of the contemplated
railway are a corporation, and that the act in question violates
the terms of this section, by authorizing the city to raise money
for and loan its credit to this corporation to enable them to construct a railroad.
We think it unnecessary to inquire whether the trustees provided for by the act are in any sense a corporation or not. For
if they are an association or organization of any kind whatever,
having a property interest in the road distinct from that of the
city, then the objection is well taken. The inhibitions of this
section are not directed against names.
But it is clear that these trustees are a mere agency through
which the city is authorized to operate for her own sole benefit.
Neither as individuals, nor as a board, have they aniy beneficial
interest iii the fund which they are to manage, or ini the road
which they are to build.
They are in fact, as well as in name, but trustees, and the sole
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beneficiary of the trust is the city of Cincinnati. They are
authorized to act only in the name and on behalf of the city.
Looking therefore to the substance of things, this case cannot
be brought within the terms of the prohibition unless we are to
regard the city itself as being one of the corporations for which
money is not to be raised, nor a loan of credit made.
We do not understand counsel as relying upon any other
grounds of objection to the validity of this act than those which
we have considered, and are of opinion that the jfidgment of the
court below must be affirmed.
We confess, very sincerely, to having
read the foregoing opinion with interest,
and at the same time, with some degree
of surprise. For if we comprehend the
scope and history of the case, it is nothing less than a deliberate and successful
attempt of the legislature, or of interested parties through the legislature,
to evade the provision of the existing
Constitution of the state of Ohio, by
allowing the city of Cincinnati to build
a railway from thence, through the state
of Kentucky, to the city of Chattanooga,
in the state of Tennessee. The provision of the Constitution is twice quoted
in the opinion, and it may not be amiss
to repeat it here. ,tThe General Assembly shall never authorize any county,
city, town, or township, by vote of its
citizens, or otherwise, to become a stockholder in any joint stock company, corporation, or association whatever; or to
raise money for, or loan its credit to or
in aid of any such company, corporation,
or association." The court, very properly recognise the fact that this prohibition would extend equally to any work
carried on by a single person.
And tle court, in stating the history
of this prohibition in the Constitution,
also recognise the fact, that it was aimed
at the aid which the municipalities had,
under the former constitution, stipulated
to render these corporate associations in
the construction of railways, and which
had, in many instances, to be.enforced

by mandamus from that court. The
court then say: "Under such circumstances this section was made a part of
the state Constitution."
The court discuss, very carefully, the question how
far the words of tle Constitution can

fairly be made to embrace the present
mode of aiding in the construction of
this railway. The mode here adopted,
it will be seen from the opinion, was to
have the Superior Court of the city
appoint a board of five trustees, who had
authority to borrow a sum of money,
not exceeding ten millions, and issue
the bonds of the city for the amount,
and a mortgage of the railway and its
income; and the city were to raise, by
tax upon its inhabitants and their property, sufficient to pay any deficiency in
the income of the road, to meet the
interest and such a sinking fund as
would ultimately pay the principal of
the bonds. This of course was first to
be approved by the city council, and by
the electors of the city, by a majority
vote.
The question then recurs, whtether
this mode of constructing tite railway
on the credit and at the expense of the
city itself, is anything less than an evasion of the ,proltibitory clause in tile
Constitution already referred to. To a
plain, simple nrian, who had not schooled
himself in the refinements of nice constructions of language, tl.ere would be
slight difficulty in finding a satisfactory
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answer to such an inquiry. It would
be simply equivalent to asking whether,
if the city of Cincinnati were prohibited
from obtaining any legislative permission, whereby they might join in the
construction of railways, this prohibition would hinder their obtaining a
legislative grant to build the entire
railway ? In this view it would merely
amount to the question, how far a prohibition extending to all the parts would
embrace the whole. And the court feel
compelled to confess, that tie prohibition of the constitution was no doubt
intended to embrace all modes of aiding
in the construction of railways, through
the instrumentality of taxation, or credit.
For, says the learned judge, "It may be,
and indeed I think it very probable,
that had the framers of the Constitution
contemplated the possibility of the grant,
to a municipal corporation, of such
powers as the acts under consideration
confer, they would have interposed
further limitations upon legislative discretion." In other words: The Constitution, by the prohibition of all then
known modes of aiding in the construetion of railways, no doubt intended to
prohibit all possible modes. This is
certainly a very wise and just conclusion,
and one eminently worthy the highest
judicial tribunal in the great state of
Ohio. But what shall be said of the
conclusion, that although this prohibition was intended to reach the case in
hand; although the case is made to
avoid the prohibition, in terms, by the
merest evasion ; yet this court is too impotent to arrest such .n obvious evasion ;
but must endorse it, as just and valid in
law ?
We know, very well, that through the
imperfection of all written law, it is sometime.snot only possible, but very probable,
that its real intent will be so imperfectly
expressed, that the courts will find it impo.,ihle to carry such intent into full
effect. And we are not disposed to

argue the point here, whether this is
one of that numerous class of cases.
But we cannot forbear to say, that if
the court had exercised the same degree
of ingenuity, in showing that where language is sufficient to give the clear sense
of the prohibition to all men of plain
common sense, and always speaks the
same imports, the courts are not allowed
to stultify themselves by affecting not to
comprehend what in fact no two sane
minds can understand differently, in
order to allow the legislature to override
the Constitution of the state ; if this had
been attempted with the same zeal and
ingenuity which are expended in the
opposite direction, the opinion would
have reached a far more satisfactory
result, and one which no honest face
need blush to recognise. But, as it is,
we can scarcely regard the decision as
very well calculated to uphold the highest
sense of judicial skill and dexterity in
reaching the acknowledged justice and
honest import of the law. We regard
all such refined arguments, as this
opinion presents, in favor of the imperfection of the language of the Constitution, while at the same time recognising its manifest and undoubted meaning, obtained through that same language, and finally allowing the latter
to fail of accomplishment through the
defects in the former, made more obvious
by speculative refinements; we cannot
but regard all such labor as affording
an education for the bar, which in the
long run brings them to estimate scholastic refinements of language as of
more value and esteem, than that honest,
blunt, outspoken construction of language, which strikes for the truth under
all circumstances, and strips it of all
disguises. But in saying this, we by
no means intend to impugn either the
wisdiom or ability of the decision, which
arc most unquestionahle ; but only to
suggc-t, that it always has a,, ugly look
in an opinion to recognise one meaning,
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purpose, and intention in the law, and
then to give it a precisely opposite construction. Such a course cannot fail to
produce a demoralizing effect upon the
profession, and to impress the mass of
citizens with the belief that courts exist
to pervert the laws, rather than to
enforce them ; all of which is specially
umfortunate and damaging in a country,
like our own, where there is no check
upon rash and evasive legislation except
through the judiciary. Those who are
not interested in carrying through such
an evasion of the fundamental law, will
regard the court as scarcely less than
accessary to the virtual fraud by which
the fundamental law of the state is overridden. All we can say by way of suggestion of improvement in the opinion
of the learned judge is, that he was not
bound by any sense of honor or liberality
to admit the prohibitions in the Constitution as clearly intended to reach the
very evil which the law in question is
designed to effect. It would have been
more consistent and more satisfactory to
have argued that no such thing is fairly
inferable from the language of the Constitution. All we desire to say further
is, that if we could see clearly to recognise, what the opinion does, that the
prohibition was intended to reach this
and all other modes of aiding in the
construction of railways, we should have
felt compelled to declare the law void
as being in violation of the true spirit
and intent of the Constitution.
Upon the general features of the law
little need be said. It seems that every
new experiment, in building railways,
through the instrumentality of taxation,
in towns and cities, is made only a new
puzzle for the courts. It must be sustained ; and the question is, howit can be most
plausibly done. We suppose that if this
had been the first case presented to the
courts there could have been but one
opinion in regard to it. All would have
exclaimed against the attempt to build
railways over the whole continent at the

expense of a single city. For if the
principle of this case is maintainable,
the city of:New York might have built
all the railways to the Pacific coast.
I. It would seem the courts must have
some control over the powers of the
legislature 'to tax towns and cities for
the construction of railways. There
could be no question, that if this statute
were for building a railway from California to Oregon, it clearly would be
void. The work, therefore, must be
specially an improvement of the town
or city taxed for its construction. It
need not terminate in such town or city;,
but it must be a feeder or contributor to
the commerce of such town or city:
Sharpless v. The City of .Philadelphia,
21 Penn. St. 147. It is not enough to
justify local taxation for constructing
public works, that it will be useful to
the district taxed. It mu.-t be specially
beneficial to that particular district above
all others.
If a public work is only generally
useful to the whole state, and it is to be
made by- taxation, it should be done by
general taxation, commensurate with the
benefit. And this will naturally raise
the question, how far the states, by
means of public taxation, can construct
works of internal irnprovement, like
canals and railways, situated entirely
in other states. Congress may no doubt
construct such public works, extending
through different states. The Constitution secures to Congress the right to
regulate the commerce of the different
states with each other. And this must
of necessity embrace commerce by land,
as well as by water. It would be absurd
to suppose, that Congress might regulate the commerce along the bed of the
great rivers of the country, but that it
could not, at the same time, regulate
the commerce upon the banks of such
rivers, in railways and canals. There
seems to have obtained, to some extent,
an opinion, that commerce, as defined in
the Unitcd States constitution, was in-
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tended to be restricted to that carried on
by navigation. INo doubt that was its
primary import and purpose; but we
can scarcely suppose the national courts
will give it any such limited and restricted application, now that the largest
proportion of the internal commerce of
the several states is carried on by means
of railways ; and in fact, a considerable
proportion of the internal commerce of
the states, which was at one time carried
on by means of tlte river and lake navigation, is now carried on by means of
railways. So that if the states were to
construct railways in other states, the
traffic upon these same railways, both
in passengers and goods, will inevitably
fall under the control of Congress. We
think, therefore, it will scarcely be
claimed that one state, by means of
public taxation, can construct public
works of internal improvement in other
states, because that will contribute to
the development of the resources of the
state creating such public works. One
state can have no possible control over
public works in another state, and no
legitimate interest in their construction
or maintenance. We have never known
any one to claim any such extension of
state power. It has been claimed by
some, that the states should build and
operate all the railways within their
own limits ; but we are not aware, that
it has ever been claimed, that it was
competent for one state to build, or
own, or even operate a railway within
the limits of another state, unless the
ownership or control of such railway
were acquired by means of indebtedness
and a mortgage legitimately created.
But we think the decision in the principal case must assume that it is competent for one state to build railways in
other states, by the legislative consent
of such other states, for the purpose of
developing its own resources. For if
one state cannot, in its sovereign capacity, assume to construct railways in
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other states, no more could it authorize
its municipalities to do so. The municipalities of a state are but political subdivisions of the state, and created and
maintained for the mere purpose of
carrying into effect a portion of the
public functions of the state. A municipality is not a joint stock corporation,
which may assume to enter into commercial contracts with the object or purpose of enhancing the amount and value
of its property or business. But it must
restrict its action to the legitimate performance of its political duties and functions. And it would be absurd and
monstrous to claim that what the state
could not do for itself, it might accomplish by means of delegating its functions to its subordinate municipalities.
That would be to allow one to perform,
through the agency of another, what he
had no power of himself to do. The
state may delegate a portion of its
general taxing power to one of its
municipalities, where the expenditure
of such tax is mainly for the benefit of
the district taxed. But it could give no
power for local taxation for the accomplishment of an object which, if its
benefits were general, the state could
not accomplish by means of general
taxation.
WVeshould, therefore, hesitate to
subscribe to the general doctrine involved in this decision, on the ground
that one state can neither by itself or its
municipalities, construct and maintain
public works of internal improvement
in other states. The thing has, no
doubt, been done sub silcntio; and it
may have been acquiesced in by some
of the decisions on this general question,
but we do not recall any such case ; and
we feel very sure that it is in conflict
with acknowledged principles of constitutional law, applicable to our complicated governmental structure.
I. F. R.
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Goods imported from a foreign country, upon which the duties and charges at
the custom-house have been paid, are not subject to state taxation whilst remaining in the original cases, unbroken and unsold, in the hands of the importer,
whether the tax be imposed upon the goods as imporis, or upon the goods as part
of the general property of the citizens of the state which is subjected to an ad
Valoren tax.
Goods imported do not lose their character as imports, and become incorporated
into the mass of property of the state until they have passed from the control of
the importer, or been broken up by him from their original cases.

IN error to the Supreme Court of the state of California.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FIELD, J.-The plaintiffs have been for several years past, and
still are, importing, shipping, and commission merchants in the
city of San Francisco, in the state of California. In 1868 they
received on consignment from parties in France certain champagne wines, of the value of ten thousand dollars, upon which
they paid the duties and charges at the custom-house. They then
stored the wines in their warehouse, in San Francisco, in the
original cases in which the wines were imported, where they
remained for sale. Whilst in this condition they were assessed as
the property of the plaintiffs for state, city, and county taxes,
under the general Revenue Law of California, which subjects all
property, real or personal, in the state, with certain exceptions,
to an ad valorem tax.
The defendant was at the time the tax collector of the city and
county of San Francisco, and as suc officer levied upon the cases
of wines thus stored for the amount of the tax assessed, and was
about to sell them when the plaintiffs paid the amount and the
charges incurred under protest, and then brought the present
action in one of the district courts of the state to recover back
the money paid. The District Court gave judgment for the
plaintiffs. The Supreme Court of the state reversed the judgment, and the case is brought here on writ of error.
The simple question thus presented for our consideration is,
whether imported merchandise, upon which the duties and charges
at the custom-house have been paid, is subject to state taxation
whilst remaining in the original cases, unbroken and unsold, in
the hands of the importer.
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The decision of this court in the case of Brown v. The ,State
,)f JlIaryland,12 "Wheat. 419, furnishes the answer to the question. The distinction between that case and the present case
does not affect the principle affirmed, which equally governs both.
In that case the question arose whether an act of the legislature of Iaryland requiring importers of foreign goods, by the
balu or package, to pay the state a license tax before selling them
in the form and condition in which they were imported, was valid
and constitutional. The court held. the act in conflict with the
provision of the Constitution which declares that no state shall,
without the consent of Congress, lay any impost or duty on
imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing its inspection laws.
In the elaborate opinion of Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL the
whole subject of the power of Congress over imports is considered,
and the line marked where the power of Congress over the goods.
imported ends and that of the state begins, with as much precision
as the subject admits. After observing that the prohibition of
the Constitution upon the states to lay a duty on imports, and
their acknowledged power to tax persons and property may come
in conflict, he says, speaking for the court: "The power and the
restriction on it, though quite distinguishable when they do not
approach each other, may yet, like the intervening colors between
white and black, approach so nearly as to perplex the understanding, as colors perplex the vision in marking the distinction between
them. Yet the distinction exists, and must be marked as the cases
arise. Till they do arise, it might be premature to state any rule
as being universal in its. application. It is sufficient for the
present to say, generally, that when the importer has so acted
upon the thing imported that it has become incorporated and
mixed up with the mass of property in the country, it has perhaps lost its distinctive character as an import, and has become
subject to the taxing power of the state; but while remaining the
property of the importer in his warehouse, in the original form or
package in which it was imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a
duty on imports to escape the prohibition in the Constitution :" 12
Wheat. 441.
In that case it was also held that the authority given to import
necessarily carried with it a right to sell the goods in the form
and condition, that is, in the bale or package, in which they were
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imported; and that the exaction of a license tax for permission
to sell in such case was not only invalid as being in conflict with
the constitutional prohibition upon the states, but also as an
interference with the power of Congress to regulate commerce
with foreign nations.
The reasons advanced by the Chief Justice not only commend
themselves by their intrinsic force to all minds, but they have
received recognition and approval by this court in repeated
instances. Mr. Chief Justice TANEY, who was at the time eminent at the bar, as he was afterwards eminent on the bench,
argued the case on behalf of the state of Maryland; and in the
License Cases, 5 How. 575, he referred to his position and
observed that, at that time, he persuaded himself that he was
right, and thought that the decision of the court restricted the
powers of the state more than a sound construction of the Constitution of the United States would warrant; "But farther and
more mature reflection," the great judge added, "has convinced
me that the rule laid down by the Supreme Court is a just and
safe one, and perhaps the best that could have been adopted for
preserving the right of the United States on the one hand, and
of the states on the other, and preventing collision between them.
The question, I have already said, was a very ,difficult one for the
judicial mind. In the nature of things the line of division is, in
some degree, vague and indefinite, and I do not see how'it could
be drawn more accurately and correctly, or more in harmony
with the obvious intention and object of this provision in the
Constitution. Indeed, goods imported, while they remain in the
hands of the importer, in the form and shape in which they were
brought into the country, can, in no just seise, be regarded as a
part of that mass of property in the state usually taxed for the
support of the state government." See also Almy v. The State
of California, 24 How. 169; Woodruff v. Parham, 9 Am. Law
Reg. N. S. 25; s. c. 8 Wall. 123; ifenson:v. Lott, 9 Am. Law
Reg. N. S. 36; s. c. 8 Wall, 148.
The Supreme Court of California appears, from its opinion, to
have considered the present case as excepted from the rule laid
down in Brown v. The State of Maryland,because the tax levied
is not directly upon imports as such, and consequently the goods
imported are not subjected to any burden as a class, but only are
included as part of the whole property of its citizens which is
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subjected equally to an ad valorem tax. But the obvious answer
to this position is found in the fact, which is, in substance,
expressed in the citations made from the opinions of MARSHALL
and TANEY, that the goods imported do not lose their character
as imports, and become incorporated into the mass of property
of the state, until they have passed from the control of the importer or been broken up by him from their original cases. Whilst
retaining their character as imports, a tax upon them in any
shape, is within the constitutional prohibition. The question is
not as to the extent of the tax, or its equality with respect to
taxes on other property, but as to the power of the state to levy
any tax. If, at any point of time between the arrival of the
goods in port and their breakage from the original cases, or sale by
the importer, they become subject to state taxation, the extent and
the character of the tax are mere matters of legislative discretion.
There are provisions in the Constitution which prevent one state
from discriminating injuriously against the products of other
states, or the rights of their citizens, in the imposition of taxes;
but where a state, except in such cases, has the power to tax there
is no authority in this court, nor in the United States, to control
its action, however unreasonable or oppressive. The power of
the state, except in such cases, is absolute and supreme: Woodruff v. Parkham, 8 Wall. 123; Henson v. Lott, Id. 148.
The argument for the tax on the wines in the present case, that
it is not greater than the tax upon other property of the same
value held by citizens of the state, would justify a like tax upon
securities of the United States, in which form probably a large
amount of the property of some of her citizens consists; yet it
has been repeatedly held that such securities are exempted from
state taxation, whether the tax be imposed directly upon them by
name or upon them as forming a part in the aggregate of the
property of the tax-payer: Bank of Commerce v. New York
City/, 2 Black 620. The rule is general that whenever taxation
by a state is forbidden, or would interfere with the full exercise
of a power vested in the government of the United States over
the same subject, it cannot be imposed. Imports, therefore,
whilst retaining their distinctive character as such, must be treated
as being without the jurisdiction of the taxing power of the state.
It follows that the judgment of the Supreme Court of California must be reversed, and it is so ordered.
VOL. XX.-24
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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
HAYS v. MILLER.
The owner of a tug-boat engaged in towing, is not a common carrier.
Therefore, in an action against such owner for negligence of his servants by
which the tow was injured, the plaintiff has the bnrden of proof of negligence.
Plaintiff having given evidence of negligence, defendant cannot rebut it by
proving the general good character and skill of his servants.
A master is liable for the negligence of his servants in the course of their employment without regard to their character for care and skill.

ERROR to the District Court of Allegheny county.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHARSWOOD, J.-The plaintiffs in the court below were the'
owners of a steam tow-boat called "The Dart," and they brought
this action to recover the amount due to them for towing three
barges laden with coal from Pittsburgh to Louisville down the
Ohio river. Their demand was not controverted, but the defendants, under the pleas of set-off and payment, made a counter
claim on the plaintiffs for damages alleged to have been suffered
by them from the loss of three other coal-barges which the
plaintiffs had undertaken to tow at the same time, and which
were wrecked and sunk by the negligence of the plaintiffs or their
servants. The defendants thus became actors, and as the owners
of a tow-boat, as has been held by this court in Leonard v. Hendrickson, 6 Harris 40, and Brown v. Clegg, decided at this term
but not yet reported, are not common carriers, the onus was upon
them to show affirmatively negligence. It is important to bear
this in mind. A common carrier is an insurer against all losses,
except such as arise from the act of God or the public enemies,
and in case of a loss it is incumbent upon him to bring himself
within the exception. The defendants below did give evidence
of the circumstances of the occurrence, which was a collision with
another tow from which the loss resulted, .and by which, as he
contended, negligence or want of skill of the servants in charge
of "The Dart," was to be inferred. To rebut this with other
evidence the plaintiffs offered to show that their servants-the
pilot and engineer-were competent, skilful, and careful officers.
This was objected to by the defendants, but admitted by the
court, and the admissibility of this evidence is the only question
presented by the assignments of error.
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It is to be remarked, so as not to confound matters which are
distinct, that the evidence offered was not as to the reputation of
those men, but by experts well acquainted with them and competent to form a judgment of their qualifications, that in point of
fact they were competent, skilful, and careful. This is putting
the point in its strongest possible aspect for the plaintiffs below;
for clearly on no principle would their reputation for skill and
competency have been admissible as relevant to the issue under
trial. Had the defendants given evidence, as it would seem they
might have done, of the incompetency of these persons for the
duties assigned them, although that of itself would not have been
a ground of recovery unless it was shown that the loss was the
result of their want of fitness, it might of course have been
rebutted by the evidence admitted below. In Hart v. Allen, 2
Watts 114, which was the case of a common carrier, evidence was
received in the first instance, on the part of the carrier, that the
captain was a man of experience, and this was met by evidence
on the other side-all this without objection; but being a common
carrier lie was responsible for all losses except such as were
caused by the act of Providence or the common enemy. That
case established, however, that in the contract of carriage by
water there was no warranty of seaworthiness as in a policy of
insurance; that to entitle the carrier to recover his freight he
need not prove that the master and crew were competent aud
sufficient, but that he was responsible only if their unfitness or
insufficiency contributed to produce the injury.
Hence, whatever may be the rule in the case of a common
carrier of goods or persons, with which we are not at present
dealing, in whose case a loss throws upon him primdfacie liability,
the rule may and ought to be different in the case of an ordinary
carrier for hire, which the owner of a tow-boat is. He is like
other bailees of the same class, only "bound to use such a reasonable degree of care and attention that the owner of the boat.
or craft towed shall incur no damage or loss through the negligence or default of the owner of such steamboat or his servants :"
6 Harris 44. The onus probandi is, therefore, on the owners of
the craft or barge towed to prove affirmatively that the loss was
occasioned by the want of skill or negligence of the owners of
the tow, or his servants placed by him in charge of it. That may
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be shown from the unskilfulness or negligence of those employed
resulting in a loss in the particular instance. When evidence of
the circumstances of the loss fails, or it is rendered doubtful how
the loss occurred, such unfitness, when established, may be sufficient to shift the anus probandifrom the bailor to the bailee. In
Penn. Railroad Co. v. Books, 7 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 525; s. c.
7 P. F. Smith 839, which was the case of an' injury to a passenger
in one train, occasioned, as was alleged, by the negligence of the conductor of another train with which it had come in .collision, we held
that it was competent to show that such conductor was a man of
intemperate habits, and that it raised the presumption of negligence
as the cause of the injury. It will be observed, that that case
was rested not on the ground of the liability of the company as
common carriers of a passenger, but as masters for the negligence
of a servant, when it was once established that the injury did not
result from any negligence in the officers of the train in which
the jlaintiff was riding. There certainly are cases, however, in
which it will be a defence in an action against a person for damages resulting from the negligence of his servants, to show that
he exercised all possible care in their selection, as where he is
sued by one servant for the negligence of a fellow-servant, or
where it is sought to make him liable for the acts or omissions or
want of skill of one employed by him in some independent work.
for the conepnsible
,
These are exceptional
m~ niis~ respo
~Aar man
a~e . A
x e~~to ~a cases.
These
sequences of the negligence of his servants in the course of their
employment, without any regard to their character for care or
skill. The owner of a raft is liable for any damage which may
be done to the property of others upon the river, occasioned by
negligence or unskilful management of his pilot, although he had
employed men who were reputed to be skilful watermen: Shaw v.
Reed, 9 W. & S. 72. In Tenney v. Tuttle, 1 Allen 185, an
action against a man for negligence in leaving a horse and carriage
in the street unfastened, evidence of his general carefulness and
prudence was ruled to be inadmissible. It was laid down that
when the precise act of omission of a defendant is proved, the
question whether it is actionable negligence is to be decided by
the character of that act or omission and not by the character for
care and caution which the defendant may sustain. In our own
case of Aerts v. Detweiler, 8 W. & S. 876, a physician sued for
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malpractice was not allowed to show, by an admitted expert, his
skill as a surgeon. The testimony as to his general skill was
declared to be clearly irrelevant. "It was not that," say the
court, "but his treatment of the particular case, with which the
jury had to do. If the latter was notoriously bad, of what
account would be his abstract science or treatment of other cases ?
It may be said that his general qualifications might serve to shed'
light on the propriety of his practice in this particular instance;
but it is light which would be less likely to lead to a sound conclusion than to lead astray." This is an authority in point, for,
navigating the tow by servants, the bailees are certainly in no
better position than if they had navigated it in person, and had
asked to be permitted to show their own general skill and competency. The negligence of the servant of a bailee to carry is his
own negligence. Qui facit per alium facit per se. In Lightner
v. Sargent, 7 Foster 460, also an action against a physician for
malpractice, in which such evidence was held to be admissible, it
was put expressly on the ground that the declaration alleged that
the injury resulted from want of skill in the defendant. In
Fisher v. Jones, 28 Cal. 626, the evidence was held to be admissible as tending to throw light upon the question whether there
was skill and care in the particular instance, but the learned
judge who delivered the opinion in that case admitted that standing alone it would not have much force. It is very important
that the principle of respondeat superior should be upheld and
maintained for the sake of general security of society, yet it is
often attended with much seeming hardship. To visit a man with
heavy damages for the negligence of a servant, when he is able
to show that he exercised all possible care and precaution in the
selection of him, is apt to strike the common mind as unjust.
Hence, unless a party claiming to recover for a loss arising from
the acts or omissions of the servant chooses himself to make his
incompetence one of his grounds of recovery, there is very great
danger that a jury will be misled by such evidence from the true
point of the controversy, and give entirely too much weight to
the evidence of character. They will not confine it to its true
bearing upon the fact of negligence in the particular case, but
set it up as per se a justification of the master. We think,
therefore, that the evidence in this case was erroneously admitted.
Judgment reversed, and venire facias de novo awarded.
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Court of Chancery? of -Delaware.
THE JACKSON & SHARP CO. v. THE PHILADELPHIA, WILMINGTON, AND BALTIMORE RAILROAD CO.
Although a revocable license such as the grant of a privilege accessary to a
permanent business, may by the expenditure of money by the licensee become a
contract which will be enforced by a court of equity, yet this principle must always
depend for its application to any particular case upon the presumed intent of the
parties that the privilege shohld be commensurate with the business as a right in
all events, and not merely as a voluntary accommodation.
It is settled that at law a license cannot create or transfer any interest in land.
Hence, a mere license affecting lands is at law always revocable though granted
for a valuable consideration, and though the licensee may have expended money on the faith of it.
This rule is modified in equity by the principle of equitable estoppel, but equitable estoppel proceeds always on the basis of preventing fraud. Its effect is to
restrain the exercise of a legal right, and this even a court of equity cannot do
unless there has been such conduct as would render the assertion of the legal right
a fraud.
The erection of a side track connecting with a railroad, at the expense of plaintiff, and the subsequent expenditure of large sums of money by him in the erection of car-works, from which cars were delivered by means of the side track,
held not to estop the railroad company from revoking their license to connect the
side track with the company's track.

THIS was a bill in equity to restrain the defendants from
taking up a side-track which connected their railway with the
works of the complainants for the manufacture of railroad cars
in the city of Wilmington.
The case arose out of these circumstances :-Messrs. Jackson
& Sharp, the predecessors in business of the Jackson & Sharp
Company, erected the car works about the year 1863, adjacent
to the railroad track in Wilmington, on the easterly side, a short
distance above the crossing at Seventh street. About the time
of the erection of the car works or soon after, but precisely when
was not proved, one of the firm, Mr. Jackson, applied to the
officers of the railroad company to connect the car works with
the railroad by means of a side-track for greater convenience in
the delivery of freight and manufactured cars. This application
wad acceded to, and after some two or three months' delay the
promised connection was effected, deliveries between the railroad

and car works being meanwhile made by temporary expedients.
Prior to Jackson & Sharp's application, a side-track had been
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laid on the same side of the railroad below Seventh street, upon
the application of other parties, for the purpose of connecting the
road with their works located below that street. To effect the
connection with Jackson & Sharp this side-track was extended by
the railroad company above Seventh street northwardly as fir
as the car works, and was there connected with the works by
curved tracks extending from the side-track into one of the shops.
Afterward, in the year 1868, upon the erection by Jackson &
Sharp of a paint shop, a similar connection was formed with that
shop. These arrangements were completed by the employees of
the railroad company, under the immediate direction of its
officers, and the expense was apportioned between the parties
according to the extent of track laid upon their respective lands.
The side-track and curves continued to be used by Jackson &
Sharp and their successors in business, the Jackson & Sharp
Company, without interruption or complaint, until the year 1870,
when a controversy arose between the parties, and the railroad
company gave notice of their purpose to take up the side-track;
whereupon the present bill was filed and a temporary injunction
obtained.
T.

. Balyard and S. M. Harrington,for the complainants.

NS.B. Smititers and G.

. Gordon, for the defendants.

BATES, C.-The claim made on the part of the complainants
to the perpetual use of the side-track in controversy as a legal
right is based upon two grounds. One of these is, that the right
was acquired by contract between their predecessors Jackson &
Sharp, and the railroad company; the other, that even were
there in the first instance no contract, but only a permissive use
of the track under a license, still that the license having been
acted upon in the expenditure of large sums of money on the
faith of its indefinite continuance, has become irrevocable under
the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
1. First, is the question of contract. Here it may be well to
notice that the point to be inquired of is, not whether upon the
application of Jackson & Sharp to the officers of the railroad
company a side-track was promised and afterward laid, but
whether the transaction included a stipulation by the company,
express or implied, for the perpetual use of the side-track by
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Jackson & Sharp and their assigns, as a right appurtenant to the
car works. Now, in the view which I take of the facts, it becomes immaterial that the right claimed is an interest in real
estate, such that under the Statute of Frauds a contract for it is
required to be in writing; for it seems quite certain upon the
proofs that there was no contract, either written or verbal, conceding to Jackson & Sharp and. their assigns, the perpetual use
of this side-track as a right, or in any degree restricting the
power of the railroad company, as owners of the soil, to take it
up at their pleasure. The case, upon the question of express
contract, rests on the testimony of Mr. Jackson, of the firm of
Jackson & Sharp, and Mr. Felton, the then president of the railroad company, who represented the parties in the original trans-'
actions, and between whom the contract, if there were any, must
have been effectuated. Both these gentlemen testify with evident
candor and caution, and without any material discrepancy in
their statements. The result of their testimony is, that at some
time early in the commencement of the car-work enterprise, after
the selection of the site for the works, but whether before or after
their erection does not appear, Mr. Jackson, on behalf of his
firm, applied to the officers of the railroad company for a connection between the car works and the railroad. The application
was acceded to, and after some delay the connection was made,
deliveries of freight and manufactured cars being meanwhile
effected by temporary expedients. Not a word, however, appears
to have passed, intended to define the respeotive rights of the
parties in the side-track after it should be laid, or to prescribe
any term or condition of its continuance, whether, on the one
hand, it should remain for the permanent accommodation of the
car works as an easement appurtenant to them, and beyond the
power of the Railroad Company to terminate it, or whether, on
the other hand, its continuance was to depend upon the mutual
interest and good-will of the parties. Mr. Jackson does not state
that there was any stipulation for the permanence of the sidetrack-not even that he understood such to be the purport of the
promise to lay the track made in response to his application for
it. Mr. Felton, the president of the railroad company, under
-whose direction the connection was made, negatives any such
stipulation by stating in substance, that he directed the connec-
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tion in the usual course of the granting of such accommodations,
and subject to the general understanding in such cases, that the
tracks forming the entire connection should remain under the
control of the respective owners of the land on which different
portions of it might be laid, without prejudice (as he must be
understood to mean) to any rights of property on either side. It
may then be safely concluded that there was no express contract.
But it was argued that a contract may be implied from the acts
of the parties. And the principle sought to be applied at this
point of the argument was bne announced by GIBSON, 0. J., in
the Pennsylvania cases of Rericie v. Kern, 14 S. & R. 267, and
Swartz v. Swartz, 4 Barr 353, that the grant of a privilege which
is accessary to a permanent business is presumed to be commensurate in duration with the business, and although at first but a
license, and as such revocable, yet that when acted upon in the
expenditure of money it becomes a contract for a valuable consideration, to be executed by a court of equity as a contract part
performed. It will be observed, that this principle must depend,
for its application to any particular case, upon the presumed
intent of the parties that the privilege granted in such case
should be commensurate with the business to which it might be
accessary as a rigit in all events, and not as an arrangement
depending upon the will of the parties for its continuance.
Ordinarily, such a presumption may be a reasonable one. In
the Pennsylvania cases it was clearly so. But after all, this
presumption, or, to speak more accurately, this inference as to the
intent of the parties, is one controlled by the circumstances of the
particular case, and may be wholly countervailed by evidence
demonstrative that the privilege in question was in fact granted
and accepted not as a perpetual, indefeasible right, but as a
voluntary accommodation, to abide the good-will and mutual
interests of the parties. Such in the present case is the construction which the evidence obliges me to give to the acts of the
parties. As this view is the one decisive of the case, some explanation of the reasons for it is due to counsel.
In the first place, then, I lay out of consideration, as a ground
for inferring the concession of a perpetual right to the use of
this side-track, the great value of such a right to the ownership
of the car works. For opposed to this, as a ground for such an
inference, is a consideration of hardly less force, which is the
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interest of the railroad company to preserve unimpaired its proprietary control over its road-bed and side-tracks. And in addition to this, is its obligation as a public corporation, to keep its
road, while held for the purposes of the incorporation, unencumbered by private rights or easements of a permanent nature, such
as might under any circumstances embarrass its use as a public
highway of travel,-an obligation held in the late Pennsylvania
cases, to be of so much force as to qualify the doctrine of Berick v. Kern, that a license is presumed to be commensurate with
the business to which it is accessary, leaving that doctrine not
applicable to licenses by railroad companies affecting lands held
by them to corporate uses: Heyl v. The Philadelpkia, Tmilmington, & Baltimore Railroad Company, 51 Penna. St. 469: TWun-:
derlich v. The Cumberland JFalley Railroad Company, a late case
in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, not yet reported. The
principle of these cases does not go so far as to preclude a railroad corporation from granting private rights or easements in its
lands, to be exercised subject to its paramount obligations to the
public; but it offers a strong ground against presuming such
grants in the absence of express stipulations,-such as would be
proper in order definitely to limit or qualify the rights granted,
as rights subordinate to the public obligations of the company.
It is clear then that the relative interests of these parties, the
one in acquiring and the other in withholding a perpetual easement in the side-track, can afford no legitimate, ground of inference as to whether or not the track was laid with an intent to
confer such an easement. That is a question to be determined
rather by the transactions between the parties than by their respective interests.
Taking up then, for this purpose, the evidence of the transactions between the parties, I am met at the outset by a fact of
irresistible force, disclosed in the testimony of Mr. Felton, the
then president of the railroad company, by whom the side track
was directed to be laid, viz. that the track was laid according to
the usual course of granting such accommodations by the company to business establishments located along its road, it being
the general understanding in such cases, that the continuance of
the accommodation was to be voluntary on both sides, prejudicing
no right of property in the soil, but leaving to the company the
absolute control over its own track, with the like control in the
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,wner of the connected works over the track laid upon his land.
And it further appears that it was with this reserved control, tacitly understood by the parties concerned, that the connections
similar to the one in question had been made between other works
and this same side-track, prior to its extension northward of Seventh street to the car works of Jackson & Sharp,-on which latter point Mr. Felton is corroborated by testimony drawn from the
connected works below Seventh street. Against the force of this
evidence the testimony of Mr. Jackson, who acted for his firm,
proves not only no stipulation with him varying the usage obtaining under other connections of this nature, but not even his own
understanding or impression that the railroad company intended
to concede the perpetual use of the side-track as a right, or upon
any other than the usual tenure of such accommodations, viz.,
mutual interest and good will. And, then in addition to all this,
is something quite inexplicable, upon the theory of a negotiation
looking to a perpetual connection with the railroad, as a legal
right appurtenant to the car works,-that is, the omission of
Jackson & Sharp to seek a grant or contract in writing for securing a title so important; and the omission of the railroad company
also in the concession of a right so seriously affecting their property, to impose some written conditions touching the maintenance
and mode of using the side-track. On the whole, gathering the
intention of these parties, as we are left to do, from their acts,
without any direct expression of it, I can construe this transaction
only as a parol license for the permissive use of the side-track,
and not as a contract for the right, express or implied.
2. Let us then proceed to consider the case in the aspect of a
license. On this branch of the case there are several material
points upon which no controversy was raised in the argument.
One of these is, that the right claimed for the complainants is to
an easement or interest in the land of the railroad company, the
claim being to the perpetual use of the side-track as a right appurtenant to the car works, transmissible with the title to them,
and binding the land of the company into whosesoever bands it
may come, at least so long as it shall be used for the purposes of
a railroad. _Pitkin v. Tle Long Island Railroad Company, 2 Barb.
Oh. R. 221, is a case very similar. Further, it is agreed that
at law an estate or interest in land can be created only by deed
or grant under seal, or by prescription, or in this country by
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twenty years' adverse possession or user; in equity such an interest may additionally be acquired by contract, which however
must, under the Statute of Frauds, be in writing, subject to an
exception of the equity arising out of part performance of a verbal contract. Again, it must be admitted that a license or permission to exercise some privilege upon the land of the licensor
can create no estate or interest in the land, such as binds the land
and is transmissible from the licensee, the utmost effect of a
license being to confer a personal privilege, which is not assignable or transmissible, and is revocable at the licensor's pleasure.
N'for, does it matter whether the license be by parol or in writing,
so long as it remains a mere license, not converted into a conveyance, grant, or contract, nor rendered irrevocable by estoppel, as
under some circumstances, to be presently noticed, it may be, in
equity though not at law. Few points have undergone more discussion, and have at lengh come to be better settled, than the
insufficiency of a license at law to create or transfer an interest
in land. In England the leading cases are Fentimanv. Smith,
4 East 107; Rex v. Herndon on the Hill, 4 M. & S. 565; Hem,
lUns v. Shipman, 5 B. & C. 22, 11 E. C. L. 207; Bryan v.
Whistler, 8 B. & C. 288, 15 E. 0. L. 219; Cocker v. Cowper, 1
C. M. & R. 418; and Tood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838, in
which last case the prior course of decisions is very fully reviewed. In this country the same rule was adjudged, as early as
1814, by 0. J. PARSoNs, in Cook v. Stevens, 11 Mass. 533. He
has been followed in many of the states: Mumford v. Whitney,
15 Wend. 384; Foot v. The N. H. J Northampton RailroadCompany, 23 Conn. 214; Foster v. Browning, 4 R. I. 47 ; -Denv.
Baldwin, 1 Zabriskie 390; Hays v. Bichardson, 1 G. & J. 38;
Carter v. Harlan, 6 Md. 20; Bridges v. Purcell, 1 Dev. & Bat.
492.
But it was earnestly urged that although a license is revocable
so long as it is executory and the parties remain in statu quo, it
ceases to be so, under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, after it
has been executed, the licensee having expended money or otherwise involved himself so that he cannot recede without prejudice ;
that in this case Jackson & Sharp having made large expenditures in erecting and afterward enlarging their car works upon
the faith of their enjoying the continued, use of this side-track,
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the railroad company are equitably estopped from revoking the
license.
Were this a case in a court of law, the answer would be that
at law a license can under no circumstances become irrevocable
by estoppel when the effect would be to create an interest in land.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel, although largely adopted in
courts of law and frequently so applied as to render licenses irrevocable, has been held not to apply to licenses, which if rendered
perpetual would amount to an easement in lands. The reason is
a plain and necessarily conclusive one, viz., that courts of law
do not recognise mere equities, such as arise out of an equitable
estoppel enforced against the legal owner of lands; but they deal
only with legal estates, such as are acquired through legal forms
of conveyance,-or their equivalent under the Statute of Limitations, an adverse possession of twenty years,-or at least by
writing under the Statute of Frauds. Hence, a mere license
affecting lands is at law always revocable, even though granted
for a valuable consideration, as in _,entiman v. Smith, 4 East
107, and "Woodv. Leadbitter, 3 M. & W. 833, and although the
licensee may have expended money under it, which was a feature
of many of the cases before cited.
It is true, however, that in this court equities in land, though
not created by any deed, grant, or writing whatever, but springing out of the acts and relations of the parties, are largely enforced, and among these a large class are those which arise under
the doctrine of equitable estoppel applied to prevent constructive
fraud-as where one having title to land is knowingly silent in
the presence of an innocent purchaser from a third person, or
where one knowing his title to land silently permits another
ignorantly to build on it-in these and in like cases this court, in
order to prevent fraud, will raise out of the transaction an equity
in favor of the party misled, binding the conscience of the owner
and restraining the exercise of his legal rights against such party.
No reason is perceived why, in a proper case, the same principle
should not in equity restrain the revocation of a privilege affecting the use of land. But it must be carefully observed, that this
principle of equitable estoppel proceeds upon the ground of preventingfraud. Its effect when applied is to restrain a party from
exercising his legal right, and this even a court of equity cannot
do unless there has been on his part some conduct, declaration,

JACKSON & SHARP CO. v. RAILROAD CO.

or improper concealment, misleading an innocent person to his
prejudice, and rendering the assertion of the legal right as against
such person an act of bad faith, amounting to constructive fraud.
Moreover, it may be well added that to warrant the interference
of the court with the legal right or title of a party, the case relied
on to work the estoppel must be clear beyond doubt upon the
facts. And the more stringently do these rules apply in a case
such as this, where the effect of the estoppel, if allowed, will be
to convert what was originally a bare privilege, temporary and
revocable, into an easement in the licensor's land, perpetually
binding it and transmissible from the licensee.
It is a fatal infirm'ity in this branch of the complainant's case
that there was nothing in all the communications had between
the officers of the company and Jackson & Sharp, or in the conduct of these officers, to justify Jackson & Sharp in assuming
that the company, by granting the accommodation applied for,
intended to relinquish any right of property in the soil. It is
agreed that no stipulation or promise to that effect was expressed.
For reasons before fully stated and which need not be repeated,
Jackson & Sharp were not warranted to infer so grave a concession by the company as the relinquishment of its proprietary
control over its soil from the bare fact that on their application
the side-track was laid, nor from its importance as a right appurtenant to the car works; nor did the general usage connected
with the granting of this sort of accommodation by the railroad
company justify the inference that a perpetual easement in this
track was conceded; but the usage was to the contrary. Looking
to all the circumstances of the case, it is my conviction that
although the connection of the car works with the railroad was
doubtless contemplated on both sides as one to be in fact permanent, yet that no stipulation to that effect was asked or given, or
supposed by either party to have been given; but that the
arrangement was tacitly left to rest upon the general understanding with respect to such accommodations,-Jackson & Sharp either
not anticipating the contingency which has now happened, or
trusting to the mutual interest and good will of the parties as a
sufficient guarantee for the permanence of the connection, without
securing it as a legal right according to prescribed forms of law.
Their disappointment certainly involves them in no little hardship. But hardship is not a ground for equitable relief, except
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in favor of one who, without any negligence in securing his rights
by the appropriate legal modes, has been misled to his prejudice
through some fraud or laches of the party against whom the
relief is sought, or by such conduct of the latter as renders it an
act of bad faith to take advantage of the mistake.
The injunction must be dissolved and the bill dismissed.

Superior Court of Connecticut.
LANDOLT v. CITY OF NORWICH.
There is a duty upon towns and cities to keep their highways in safe condition
for travelling by foot passengers as well as others.
But this duty as applied to ice and snow on a sidewalk is not a duty to keep the
sidewilks absolutely free from ice, and the liability of the city for injuries received
by a fall on the ice, is to be determined in each case by the particular circumstances existing in that case.

THIS was an action for damages received by a fall on the ice.

Wait & Swan and Holbrook, for plaintiff.
Halsey and Pratt,for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SEYMOUR, J.-The plaintiff claims damages for an injury suffered by him on Sunday, Jan. 8th 1871, by reason, as he says, of
a defective sidewalk in the city. About four o'clock in the afternoon of that day, while walking along Union street, he slipped
and fell, receiving an injury of some severity. It is clear that
the ice was the cause of the accident, and the only question in the
case is, whether the condition of the sidewalk was such, as under
the circumstances to subject -the city to damages.
The rule of law on the subject, as recently settled by the court
of errors, is that some duties may devolve on cities and towns in
regard to ice, and that what those duties are cannot be definitely
defined by law, but must in each case depend upon all the circumstances of it, the general rule being that towns and cities must
use reasonable care to make their streets'safe for public travel,
whether on foot or in carriages.
The facts are briefly these: The street is one of considerable
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public travel; the plaintiff was walking upon a well-constructed
pavement in front of premises occupied by Mr. Greenwood. The
lands adjoining this street are such as to require more than ordinary care to prevent the water from overflowing the sidewalk,
and prior to the winter when the accident happened the overflow
had been troublesome;. but in 1870 underdrains had been made
at considerable expense, by which most of the water was thoroughly
carried- off. At about the place where the accident happened
the driveway of Mr. Nichols crosses the pavement, and water
running along the sides of the drive-way had been frozen. There
was no complaint on the part of the plaintiff that the pavement
was not properly constructed in itself, or in reference to the adjoining grounds. On the other hand everything seems to have
been done that could reasonably be required in making the pavement safe and convenient.
Friday, the 6th, had been rainy. Saturday was pleasant but
cold, the thermometer at 1 P. M.standing at 84 degrees. Sunday
was fair in the forenoon, but between noon and 4 P. m. about half
an inch of snow fell and covered the ice on which the plaintiff
slipped. No one testified to having seen any ice on the pavement
on Friday. Mr. Nichols, who seems to have had means of knowledge, testifies with confidence that there was not a particle of ice
there on that day. He says that on Sunday morning he first
noticed it, and he describes it as a thin scale of ice about a yard
square, which appeared to be caused by water that during the
night (or perhaps the afternoon of Saturday) had overflowed the
surface drain of the drive-way. I am inclined to think Mr. Nichols's account is substantially correct. The plaintiff, indeed, and
the gentleman who was with him at the time he fell, think the
patch of ice was larger and thicker than described by ir. Nichols. But their attention was absorbed by the hurt which the
plaintiff had received, and by reason of the ground being covered
with snow their means of knowledge are quite limited.
The question then is, whether on these facts neglect is fairly
imputable to the city. Could it reasonably be expected and required that this piece.of ice should receive the attention of the
street commissioner during the time it was on the walk ?
The plaintiff claims that by simply casting ashes or sand on the
place it would have been made safe, and that the city ought to be
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on the watch for such dangerous places and apply the proper and
easy remedy without delay.
The defendant on the other hand insists that particles of ice
like that which caused this accident ai'e oi'dinarily not damaging;
that it probably did not exteid across the sidewalk; that room
was left for safe walking Without going upon it, and that had it
not been for the snow which was falling, and which hid the ice
from the plaintiff's view, he would have passed in safety. The
defendant also insists that the public authorities had no notice
of the condition oft the sidewalk, and that it would be unreasonable to require of them that they should be constantly on the
watch for such places of slight peril, and apply immediate remedy
to them.
Such patches of ice on sidewalks are abundant during the winter weather, formed by rain and melting snow, and leakage of
conductors and imperfect drainage, and the ice so formed is subject to rapid change of place and condition. The removal of it or
covering with sand and ashes on 11 the sidewalks of the city, is
a matter requiring 'ime and involving no trifling expense. Constant repetitions of the labor are usually needed every winter.
,During the past week, on three occasions, the walks here were no
sooner cleared after a storm than a succeeding storm again covered the earth with snow and ice.
In our country villages snow and ice are generally suffered to
remain as they are left by the laws of nature. Volunteer forces
of public-spirited citizens sometimes attend to places of more
-than usual peril or difficulty, but the selectmen, as such, seldom
interfere. The pedestrian in the country is rarely in the winter
exempt from perils by ice, but witi good heed to his ways he seldom meets with.an dccident.. *Thd peril is not such as to warrant
the great expense in a sparsely inhabited village, of attempting a
preventive or a remedy; -but in cities the aggregate of peril by
reason of the numbers exposed to it becomes considerable, and the
means of meeting the needful expense are ample; and bence in
cities the public as such properly undertake the duty of doing the
best they can to provide against the dangers to travel which winter in this climate necessarily brings with it. The city of Norwich has entered on the performance of this (hIty, and must be
held to perform it with ordinary diligence and care. Well-clearel pavements are justly felt to be convenient and necessary, and
VOL. XX.-25
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I would not underestimate the importance of due attention to
their safety, especially here where the peril of slipping is greatly
increased by the grade of the streets.
It cannot, however, be the rule of duty that all the sidewalks
shall at all times be kept absolutely free from ice. Such a rule
would involve expense disproportioned to the object to be accomplished. The street commissioner testifies that he first attends
the front of public buildings and public squares and public places,
and to the front of vacant lots, relying that by force of a city
ordinance to that effect, individual citizens will promptly attend
to the pavements adjacent to their occupied premises; the commissioner himself taking, however, a general oversight of the
whole city, and applying the remedy in case of an occupant's
neglect; and he probably does, what was not distinctly stated by
him, direct his early and more particular attention to places where
travel is most concentrated, as in the approaches to the post office,
depots, market places, and the like.
The course adopted by the commissioner seems to be correct
and reasonable, and faithfully executed; and in view of all the
facts and considerations applicable to the subject, I think the city
is not chargeable with neglect in respect to the particular piece
of ice in question. Such spots will escape the most careful vigilance for at least a few days. It is not reasonable to expect that
every square yard of pavement in the city will be reached and cared
for by the commissioner. No one has testified that he saw the ice,
and regarded it as dangerous. Mr. Nichols, the only witness who
testified to having seen it at all, evidently considered it as requiring no immediate attention.
Under these circumstances I cannot say the city is in fault, and
while I regret the injury the plaintiff suffered, must find the issue
for the defendant.

District Court of United States, District of _Bhode Island.
CHARLES T. CHILDS
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SAMUEL GLADDING

ET AL.

The majority in interest, of the owners of a vessel, are entitled to the possession
and control of her, as against the master, although the master is a part owner.
The majority in interest may dismiss the master though a part owner, at any
time they see fit.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
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KNOWLES, J.-This is a cause of possession, civil and maritime,

promoted by 0. T. Childs et al. against Samuel Gladding et al.,
the libellants, as owners of twenty-three thirty-second parts of the
schooner Allen Middleton, Jr., claiming possession and control
of her, as against the respondents, the owners of the remaining
nine thirty-second parts.
The libel, as filed on the 12th of April 1871, alleged as grounds
of judicial action, First-The ownership of the schooner, as above
stated, and secondly, "That the libellants are desirous of employing her in the coasting trade, and for this purpose, of placing in
her a master satisfactory to themselves, and in whom they have
confidence, but that the said Samuel Gladding, having heretofore
been master of the said schooner, refuses, though requested to
deliver up possession of her to the libellants, and persists in his
claim to continue in her as master, notwithstanding the demand
made upon him by the libellants for possession and control of her,
and he, and some of the other part-owners refuse to unite with
the libellants in the employment of said vessel, though, as the
libellants believe, a part of the owners, now absent, would join
with them in the employment of said vessel, if here present.
On the 20th of April, without objection, the libel was amended
by inserting three additional articles to the effect following: 1st,
that said Gladding -was appointed master of the schooner, about
the 3d of March 1871, under a special agreement that he should
remain master only so long as he gave satisfaction to the owners,
and that before the filing of the libel, "he was informed by the
libellants, who constituted a large majority in interest of such
owners, that he did not give satisfaction to the owners, and that
they had removed him as such master and demanded of him the
possession of said vessel, and to surrender up to them the papers
thereof: 2d, that said Gladding, while he was master of said vessel, misused and abused her by greatly overburdening her, whereby she was strained and caused to leak badly and otherwise damaged; and 3d, that said Gladding is incompetent to act as master
of said vessel."
To the libel, as thus amended, the said Gladding intervening
for his interest in the schooner, filed his answer, embodying six
defensive allegations, of the first and sixth of which, however, it
is not necessary here to speak.
The second was in substance, That during the months of De-
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cember 1870, and January and February 1871, he acted as agent
of all the owners concerned in the purchase of said schooner, who
unanimously appointed him master thereof, without any stipulation or condition, and, in consideration thereof, he became part
owner; that in a subsequent agreement, on the 3d of March
1871, a contract concerning the employment of the schooner and
the division of her earnings was embodied,, and it was expressly
stipulated that he, said Gladding, was to act as master of the
schooner, as long as he gave satisfaction to the owners-that the
meaning of the stipulation was, "that until he, said Gladding,
did some act as master that gave the owners just cause of complaint or reasonable ground for dissatisfaction," he was to command and have possession of the schooner; that in pursuance of
said agreement he gave up other employments, and on the
of March 1871, entered upon his duties as captain and manager
of the schooner, having made in her since that date a successful
trip to Baltimore, and having jsettled the accounts of the vessel
'for that trip with the several shareholders-they " all expressing
themselves satisfied ;" that he was rrfnging for and about sailing
on a second trip, when the libellants, by instituting these proceedings and arresting the schooner,, obstructed the sailing, use and
-employment of her, to his great damage as one of the owners and
master of the same, and in unjust violation and breach of the said
contract-he denying that the libellants or owners had any just
cause of complaint against, or reasonable ground of dissatisfaction
with him for any act done or suffered- to be, done by him in the
command of said schoner, or the management of her affairs or
settlement of her accounts.
The third allegation was, in substance, a denial or traverse of
the charge of misusing, overloading or.straining the vessel: the
fourth, in -substance, a denial of the charge of incompetency as
master of said vessel, coupled with an averment that for over thirty
years he had been a mariner by profession,-had served in all
capacities (save that of cook) on board of vessels, and had been
master of other schooners before, to wit, of the Mary H. Mifflin;
Thomas Hallet; Flight; Gov. James Y. Smith; Science, of Bristol; Phcenix, of Stonington ; and others, and that no vessel under
his command ever had any injury done to her, or any accident
happen to her that might have been avoided by the master. The
fifth was, substantially, an allegation that he was the legal, bond
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fide owner of two thirty-second parts of the schooner, and that
another thirty-second part is held for him by one William Butler,
under an agreement to convey to him on payment of an agreed
price.
The cause came to hearing upon libel, answer and documentary
and oral proofs, several of the owners, the captain included, appearing as witnesses, and the several points set forth in, or sug-"
gested by the libel and answer, were distinctly presented and
made the subjects of inquiry and argument. To such only of
these as upon full, consideration of the whole cause I deem of
controlling importance shall I refer, as matters of comment on
this occasion.
In regard to certain principles or maxims of the law maritime, no question is raised at the bar. The learned counsel
of the parties agree that in general the majority in interest of
the owners of a vessel are entitled to the control, use and possession of her, and that this right of the majority the admiralty
will protect,-of course,-duly regarding the rights of the minority, to demand security for the restoration of their property in
specie or otherwise. Also, they agree that in general the owners
of a vessel (that is the majority in interest of them), have the
power of appointment and removal of the master at will, for any
or no cause, as they may see fit, and that of course no objection
or complaint, on the part of a captain, to an exercise of this
power by the owners, is of any avail, unless grounded on the terms
of some special contract between himself and those owners. But,
at this point arises a question upon which the learned counsel are
widely at variance, and upon which, it cannot be denied, text
writers arid jurists seem to be not fully in accord. Thus, on the
part of the claiffiant, it is contended that when it happens that a
part-owner, co-operating with the minority, occupies the position
of captain, the general principles above stated lose their value for
all practical purposes, unless the majority can show some adequate,
just or reasonable cause for removing or dispossessing such
captain.
On the part of the libellants, on the other hand, it is maintained
that the right of the majority in interest is as perfect and its
power as irresistible, against the captain, though a part-owner, as
against any other shareholder, whatever his occupation or his
residence-landsman or seaman. And accordingly, as their first
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position, they claim that upon their petition or libel, as originally
filed, in which the only ground for action set forth, is the majority's
right of possession, without even an allusion to any cause of dissatisfaction, they are entitled to the relief prayed. On principle,
they say, this claim can be sustained, and, while they acknowledge
their inability to produce, in support of it, any adjudicated case
from the English or American reports, they challenge a production of an adjudicated case militating with their position.
In reply to this, and in support of his own position, the learned
counsel of the claimant, with apt and cogent remarks and arguments, cites several authorities deservedly of high repute, viz. :
3 Kent 162 and notes; Story on Part., §§ 432 and 445 and
notes; Flanders on Ins., § 65 and notes; 1 Parsons on S. and A.
95 and notes; Abbott on Ins. 104 and notes.
On referring to these, we learn that whatever is found in these
works sustaining the claimant's views, is assumed and represented
to be dictated or warranted by certain three cases in the English
Admiralty, in tempore Sir William Scott (1802-10-11). The first
of these is The New -Draper,4 C.Robinson 287. The owners of
9-16ths of a vessel sued for possession the owner of 7-16tbs (who
also was captain). The suit was contested, on the ground that
the captain was in fact the owner of 14-l6ths, having paid for
seven of the nine shares holden at the commencement of the suit
by certain of the libellants. The bills of sale, which he had taken,
were, however, deemed by the court defective, and a judgment for
possession was entered for the libellants, as being the majority in
interest. So far as appears, the only point raised or discussed
was the validity and effect of the alleged purchase of seven shares
by the defendant, after suit brought. In pronouncing judgment,
the court said: "The dispossession of a master is, in its nature,
not an uncommon proceeding. All that the cburt requires in
cases where the master is not an owner, is that the majority of the
proprietors should declare their disinclination to continue him in
possession. In the case of a master and part-owner, something
more is required before the court will proceed to dispossess a person who is also a proprietor in the vessel, and whose possession,
therefore, the common law is, upon general principles, inclined to
maintain. It is not, however, by any means unprecedented for
this court to proceed even to that extent; but then some special
reason is commonly stated to induce the court to interpose. I
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observe there is a reason given in this case, and the same that
most frequently occurs, 'that the master is irregular in his accounts with his owners.' " The conclusion of the court's opinion
is as follows: "The case becomes, therefore, a common case of
the majority of owners proceeding against one in which the common rule of the court must be pursued. Possession decreed."
The head note of the case, it may be well to state, is simply " Case
of possession. Master dispossessed at the application of a majority of interests."
The second of these cases is Johan and Seignmond, Edwards 242,
decided in 1810, eight years after the decision in The New -Draper.
The head-note is, "Cause of possession. Suit not entertained by
the court in the case of a foreign ship." The only allusion in
the report of the case to the point in question, is this single sentence: "If this were a British ship, there can be no doubt that,
by the practice of this court, it would, upon the application of a
majority of the parties interested, proceed to dispossess the master,
though a part-owner, without ninutely considering the merits or
demerits of his conduct."
The third of the three cases is See leater,1 Dodson 22, decided
in 1811. The majority of the owners sought to dispossess the
captain, who was also an owner of 5-16ths of the vessel. The
decree was against the captain. The only portion of the report
of this case, of any pertinence in this connection, is the first sentence of the court's opinion, in these words: "In cases of ships
belonging to British subjects (the See Reater was owned exclusively by aliens), the court has no hesitation in ordering possession to be delivered up on the application of a majority of the
owners, without entering very minutely into the causes of dissatisfaction existing between them and the master."
That there is found no adjudicationin support of the claimant's
position is apparent. Nor less apparent is it, that, in the view of
the judge, an assignment of a reason for the dispossession of a
master part-owner was rather matter of form than substance. In
The .Neiw -Draper,he says merely that some special reason is
"commonly stated"-not that this is necessary, or even important
-and his after utterances, in 2 Edwards and 1 Dodson, negative
the inference that even he would have sustained a demurrer to a
petition in which the majority of part-owners claimed possession,
without assigning other cause than the majority's will and order.
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Assuming, as I am warranted in doing, that no adjudication
upon this point adverse to the libellant's position can be produced,
aind failing to find in the argument of the learned counsel of the
claimant, or in the text-books to which reference is made, any
sufficient answer to the argument in support of that position, I am
-constrained to concur in the views of the libellants. No satisfactory reason is assigned or suggested by Sir WILLIAM SCOTT, or
any commentator, or by the learned counsel of the claimant, for
holding that a part-owner of a ship, who secures for himself an
appointment as master of the craft, is entitled to retain his office
and keep possession of the vessel until he shall see fit to resign
or surrender, against the expressed will of the majority of the
owners,-unless that majority can show reasonable and sufficient
cause,-some misfeasance or nonfeasance for his removal and
deposition. Of special contracts between a ship's master .ard a
ship's owners I am not now treating, -but of the relations, betweea
a master who is also a part-owner and his co-owners.;after h'is,
appointment.. Is the pa'rt-owner .svho is appointed master of a
ship endowed with any new or additional'right as a; part-ovner.?
Wfien, oii:his 'electofi :h- sfeps'up6n deck, afe his ielition .to the
ship and his :irights in and over, it The, saihe as : thds6 of - part:
own'er 6f- a horg, In his ex~hisive custody in and -over that horse,
as- gttld: ut' coinmon law ? To .these inquiriesit is believed a
negative answer mist be .giVeh.- Tha iftclividua] remains laftow~ner'.with all his'rights as such, hs bbfbre his appointment to
the mastership, and nio ifore.' As mast*r .h6 is to be regarded
simply: as the agent of 'the' owners as a body, with no other rights
qua inast6r than he would -have were he not a shareholder. This,
as, it 'seems to me, is, or of right ought to be, regarded as the
better law upon the point ift question. It is, as is believed, consistent'with well-settled and familiar rules 'and principles, while
its opposite leads logically and necessarily to results and conclusions which the professiofi would be slow to, adopt, and the business community quick to condemn. Refraining from further
remark upon this point, as supererogatory labor, I sustain the
point raised in limine by the libellants as above presented.
It is obvious, moreover, that by the amendment of their libel
above mentioned it is made to conform to the views of the English
jurist. A "special reason" and "causes of dissatisfaction" are
set forth; but how "minutely" these causes should be considered

CHILDS v. GLADDING.

-whether as matters of contestation upon proofs and argument
or not-is left by him to the conjectures of his readers.
Of the evidence submitted by the libellants in the case in
support of their charges or allegations of incompetency, and of
misusing and overstraining the Middleton, it is sufficient here to
say that it failed to substantiate those charges when weighed in
the balance with the claimant's proofs in rebuttal.
Assuming it is proven or adafitted: that the libellants are
owners of 23-32 of the schooner, and the claimant owner of 2-32
only (the owners of the remaining 7-32 not entering appearance),
and that the claimant, though requested, has refused to surrender
possession, I must pronounce for the libellants, unless ground for
a contrary judgment is found in the second defensive allegation
of the claimant's answer, already stated in substance.
On recurring to this it is seen that he claims to have been
unanimously appointed captain of the Middleton in the winter of
1871, and in proof of this he exhibits the subscription list upon
which the owners contracted for their several shares-reading
thus: "We, the subscribers, agree to take or hold the respective
shares set against our names of schooner Allen Middleton, Jr.,
said vessel to be commanded by Captain Samuel Gladding.
Providence, November 30th 1870." Of this portion of the allegation and its proof I deem it sufficient to say that its relevancy
and importance I have failed to perceive, inasmuch as the
claimant proceeds to aver that subsequently, viz., on the 3d of
March 1871, a more formal agreement or contract between himself and his co-owners was made, in view of which, as he strenuously contends, the court should refrain from interfering "4to aid
either party in attempting to violate it."
In the construction of this writing referred to, contended for
by the claimant, I am unable to concur, and this whether it be
considered separately from or in connection with "surrounding
circumstances" concerning which testimony was received under
objection. The co-owners of the vessel (the claimant among
them), on the 8d of March 1871, convened to ascertain the then
will of the then majority in regard to the use of their joint property, and the action and will of the majority, so far as need here
be inquired, was embodied in the following paper, to which the
signatures of owners of 16-32, and no more, of the vessel (including the claimant owning 2-32) were attached
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"It is agreed between the owners of schooner Allen Middleton,
Jr., and Captain Samuel Gladding, as follows:
"Captain Gladding is to command the schooner so long as he
gives satisfaction to the owners, and she is to be employed in the
freighting business between ports not south of Cape Henry, and
all northern and eastern ports.
"The division of gross earning is to be as follows :-Captain
Gladding is to receive 3-5, and the owners 2-5 of the same.
Captain Gladding to victual and man the vessel and to sail her,
paying all port charges and all other charges appertaining to the
running of said vessel, the owners only to pay such bills as are
necessarily incurred in keeping the schooner in good running
order. Captain Gladding is to make up his account after every
trip, and after making deductions named above, he is to divide
the balance among the owners.
"It is agreed that all bills made up for -expenditure on the
vessel shall, before being charged in Captain Gladding's accolint,
be submitted to Mr. James M. Cross, of Providence, for' his
approval. Before the vessel leaves Providence all bills against
the schooner are to be collected, and accounts made up by Captain Gladding and presented to owners for payment."
It is noticeable that of the seven signatures to this instrument
(including Captain Gladding's) four are included among the
libellants, and two have disposed of their shares.
For dissenting from the construction given by the claimant to
this contract, it seems not necessary to state in full my reasons.
It must suffice to say, that even did it bear the signature of each
and every owner (instead of only half of them), and were they
now, all of them, still owners (which is not the fact), and were
there not now (which is the fact) owners who had no interest in
the vessel in March last, I should nevertheless hold that the
majority in interest is entitled to the possession of the vessel,
either as against the claimant alone, captain and part-owner
though he be, or against him and his co-owners of the minority.
That the co-owners of a ship may not, by contracts and covenants
or otherwise, estop themselves from exercising their rights in
regard to the appointment or removal of a master, or the control
and management of the ship, is not affirmed. It suffices to say
that, under the facts in the case, the contract of lMarch 3d,
exhibited in proof, lacks more than one of the essentials of a
contract of that species.

